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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants' Brief is most striking not for what Defendants say, but for what 
they do not say. Initially, Defendants concede that the relevant facts are undisputed 
and that the application of the standard for equitable relief, including the trial court's 
conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents were grossly negligent, is an issue of law 
reviewed for correctness by this Court. [Brief of Appellees, p.2] At the same time, 
Defendants fail to provide this Court with any legal authority, from Utah or elsewhere, 
that would support the trial court's conclusion that the conduct of U. S. Realty's agents 
here constituted the type of culpable gross negligence justifying the forfeiture of its 
valuable leasehold interest in the K-Mart Center. U. S. Realty stands to lose the 
substantial improvements on the property, which U. S. Realty or its predecessors 
constructed, and the future income to be realized from those interests. Defendants 
have altogether failed to demonstrate why U. S. Realty's conduct should be deemed so 
much more egregious than the conduct of the tenants granted equitable relief in the 
cases cited in the Brief of Appellant. Nor do Defendants even attempt to supply any 
authority supporting the trial court's determination that mere negligence becomes 
"gross negligence" simply because U. S. Realty's agents were "professionals." 
What is most striking, however, is Defendants' complete failure to confront 
directly the issue of waiver. In particular, Defendants' say nothing about the trial 
court's erroneous determination that Defendants cannot be deemed to have waived the 
requirement for timely notice because they never bothered to read the Lease 
Agreements (even when they received U. S. Realty's notices exercising the options to 
renew) and, therefore, did not "intentionally" relinquish their right to such notice. 
Rather, Defendants choose to discuss the issue of waiver largely in passing, by taking 
various statements made by this Court in Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 
1998), out of context and asserting that there can be no waiver because Defendants' 
actions did not cause U. S. Realty to provide late notice. 
In fact, however, Geisdorf, upon which Defendants so heavily rely, virtually 
mandates reversal of the trial court's refusal to find waiver. In particular, this Court in 
Geisdorf squarely stated, in the context of its discussion of waiver, that "each party has 
the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or she affixes his or 
her signature to it," and that a "party may not sign a contract and thereafter assert 
ignorance or failure to read the contract as a defense." 972 P.2d at 73 (quoting John 
Call Eng'g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah 1987). The reference 
to "each party," of course, decisively disposes of the trial court's primary basis for 
refusing to find waiver — the admitted failure of Defendants to acquaint themselves 
with the terms of the Lease Agreement. 
The necessary rejection of this argument leaves nothing, in Defendants' Brief or 
in the trial court's opinion, that would provide any basis for failing to find waiver. 
This is not a case like I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House v. Berets, 32 Utah 
454 (1907), in which the Court refused to find waiver based solely upon alleged 
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conversations in which the tenant advised the landlord of a "mere intention to make a 
request" to renew. 32 Utah at 466 (quoted in Appellees' Brief, at p. 15). Rather, this 
is a case in which U.S. Realty exercised the option to renew in writing, albeit past the 
date set forth in the Lease Agreement. Defendants, after receiving such written notice, 
acted in a manner that clearly, conclusively and unambiguously manifested their 
acceptance of the renewal by: (1) entering into an Agreement with U. S. Realty, 
subsequent to the notices of April 17, 1998, by which U. S. Realty agreed to forego any 
rights to the condemnation proceeds in exchange for ground rent reductions during the 
option periods; (2) requesting Mark Hoffman to contact their attorney, Mr. George 
Fadel, to have the necessary paperwork prepared to memorialize the settlement of the 
condemnation action; (3) requesting and accepting payment from U. S. Realty for 
sewer assessments that extended into the option period, and would only be due if the 
option had been exercised; and (4) requesting and accepting payment from U. S. Realty 
for the slope easement which, again, related to the option period and would only be due 
if the option had been exercised. 
U. S. Realty must also prevail on its claim for equitable relief. Defendants do 
not argue that U. S. Realty must be denied equitable relief under the legion of cases 
throughout the nation that have recognized such a right. Instead, Defendants argue that 
this Court should refuse to recognize such a claim at all on the basis of Geisdorf and 
Berets, even though neither case stands for that proposition, and even though Geisdorf 
clearly indicates that Utah law is to the contrary. 
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With respect to the issue of "gross negligence," Defendants supply no legal 
authority whatsoever, but simply argue that U. S. Realty's agents were "grossly 
negligent" because U. S. Realty had received correspondence from representatives of 
the Utah Department of Transportation referencing the expiration of the initial terms of 
the Ground Leases and, moreover, because they knew that U. S. Realty's tenant, K-
Mart, had to provide a written notice to U. S. Realty of K-Mart's exercise of its own 
option. U. S. Realty's agents, however, fully explained the reasons why these events 
did not lead them to immediately review the renewal provisions of the Ground Leases 
in light of the Lease Abstract system, which they had every reason to believe would 
provide them with sufficient notice of any necessary dates. Defendants have failed to 
provide any legal authority suggesting that circumstances such as these, or anything 
even remotely analogous to circumstances such as these, would elevate "mere neglect," 
as to which equitable relief would be available, to "gross negligence," justifying the 
punitive result of forfeiture. 
The focus of claims for equitable relief must simply be whether the "forfeiture" 
and the "gravity of the loss" would be "out of all proportion to the gravity of the fault." 
J.N.A. Realty Corp v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 1313,1317-18 (N.Y. Ct. 
App. 1977). Where, as here, the Defendants not only suffered no prejudice or harm 
from the late exercise of the option to renew but, by their own admission, did not even 
pay attention to the exercise and simply proceeded forward in a manner that recognized 
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that the option had validly been exercised, this question virtually answers itself. The 
Judgment of the trial court must, therefore, be reversed. 
II 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FIND WAIVER IN THE FACE OF UNDISPUTED 
FACTS ESTABLISHING A MANIFEST AND DISTINCT INTENT ON DEFENDANTS' 
PART TO DISPENSE WITH THE TIME REQUIREMENTS FOR NOTICE UNDER THE 
LEASES CONSTITUTES CLEAR ERROR. 
Defendants cannot dispute that this Court, in Geisdorf, acknowledged that strict 
compliance with the terms of a renewal option can be waived by a landlord and, 
moreover, that the waiver can be implied from conduct manifesting such an intent. 
Nor do Defendants offer any conceivable basis upon which a Court could reasonably 
find that their conduct, including what the trial court found was an agreement reached 
subsequent to receipt of the April 17, 1998, renewal notices, providing for a reduction 
in rent during the option period, was anything other than a clear and unambiguous 
manifestation of an intent to accept those delayed notices. 
Nevertheless, Defendants state, in perfunctory fashion, that their "silence" does 
not demonstrate implied waiver, nor does the "discussions of rent reduction during the 
option periods," citing the trial court's statement that the negotiations between the 
parties "is not what caused plaintiff to fail to provide timely notice." [Brief of 
Appellees, pp. 9-11]. Defendants also cite Geisdorf for the proposition that "mere 
silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation to speak," Id. at p. 12, 
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and cite Berets for the proposition that waiver cannot be established by the landlord's 
knowledge of the tenant's "mere intention to make a request." Id. at p. 15. Other than 
these conclusory statements and out-of-context quotations, Defendants offer no further 
justification for the trial court's rejection of waiver, other than to rely upon the trial 
court's analysis. This analysis was entirely based on the erroneous legal theory that 
because Defendants never read the Lease Agreements, and because they paid no 
attention whatsoever to the notices of renewal when they were received, they cannot be 
deemed to have "intentionally" waived their right to receive notices that they did not 
care about. Id. at 32. 
Initially, the argument that Defendants' conduct was not the cause of U. S. 
Realty's late exercise of notice is legally irrelevant. Although the doctrine of estoppel 
requires detrimental reliance, the doctrine of waiver does not. See, e. g.f Braugh v. 
Phillips, 557 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (waiver of a contractual right 
may be effective after the time for performance if condition waived is not material part 
of agreed exchange of performance and non-performance does not materially affect 
value received); Old Mill Printers v. Kruse, 392 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 
("a condition of notice can be eliminated by a voluntary waiver of the promisor, either 
before or after the time the notice is due"). Certainly, this Court in Geisdorf did not 
suggest that waiver can only be found if it is the cause of a tenant's failure to strictly 
comply with an option, stating simply that waiver requires only that there be an 
existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence and an intention to 
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relinquish it. 972 P.2d at 72 (quoting Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993)). As this Court also made clear, conduct 
evidencing a "distinct intent to waive the written notice requirement" will give rise to a 
finding of waiver. Id 972 P.2d at 73-74. 
In this case there is no need to find an intent to waiver the written notice 
requirement entirely, but rather, simply to find an intent to waive the specific time 
requirements for the giving of such written notice. Written notice was in fact given 
and duly received by Defendants more than three months prior to the expiration of the 
initial 25-year terms of the Ground Leases. After receiving these notices, Defendants 
were not merely silent, but took affirmative actions, including the reaching of 
agreements with U. S. Realty and the request for and acceptance of payments from U. 
S. Realty relating to the option periods, which cannot be reconciled with any intent 
other than an acceptance of the untimely exercise of the option. 
This leaves, then, only the trial court's finding that Defendants did not waive 
the right to timely notice because they did not read the Ground Leases and, therefore, 
did not "know" that they had the right to receive timely notice. This argument is 
conclusively disposed of by this Court's observations in Geisdorf that "each party has 
the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or she affixes his or 
her signature to it," and that a party "may not sign a contract and thereafter assert 
ignorance or failure to read the contract as a defense." 972 P.2d at 73. Nothing in 
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Geisdorf indicates that this obligation is unilateral, to be visited solely upon a tenant, 
but not upon a landlord. 
Indeed, the precise reasoning of the trial court, endorsed by Defendants in their 
Brief, was considered and rejected in Adam v. Consoling 135 Conn. 321, 64 A.2d 44 
(S. Ct. Errors 1949), where the tenant tendered payment in advance for the first three 
months of the extended Lease term, which was received by the landlord and accepted 
in the absence of the tenant's written notice to extend in accordance with the terms of 
the Lease. Like the Defendants here, the landlords argued that "there was no evidence 
that they knew the expiration date of the lease at the time they accepted the check." 
135 Conn, at 324, 64 A.2d at 45. The Court rejected this argument in words equally 
applicable here: 
In the absence of other facts [landlord] cannot take the position 
that they had not read the lease or, having read it, had forgotten 
its provisions. The law conclusively imputes to ["landlord"!, 
when she had the conversation with the plaintiff, knowledge of 
the terms of the lease. . . . This is a 'most wholesome and 
necessary rule, . . . otherwise it would lay open to a party to a 
contract entirely too wide a field for a denial of knowledge, 
which would in many cases be impossible. The finding cannot 
be corrected. The requirement of a written notice of the 
exercise of the option was for the benefit of the lessors and 
could be waived by them orally or by conduct." 
Id. at 324, 64 A.2d at 45-46 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
In short, if U. S. Realty is charged with knowledge of the terms of the Ground 
Leases, so are the Defendants, and the trial court's refusal to find waiver cannot be 
sustained. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT U. S. REALTY'S AGENTS WERE 
GROSSLY NEGLIGENT CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR BASED ON THE 
UNDISPUTED FACTS. 
1. Applicable Legal Standard. 
Perceiving the weakness in their argument that U. S. Realty's agents were 
grossly negligent, Defendants now claim that the appropriate legal standard 
nonetheless precludes equitable relief where the requesting party was merely negligent 
or guilty of inadvertent oversight. The trial court rejected these same arguments, 
concluding that the Utah Supreme Court in Geisdorf implicitly adopted a standard that 
provides for equitable relief even if a party has been negligent, but not grossly 
negligent. [Memorandum Decision, p. 7-8] Defendants' argument to the contrary 
lacks substantive merit. 
As described in Appellant's Brief, the over-whelming majority of jurisdictions 
having confronted requests for equitable relief have granted it where a tenant has been 
negligent or acted inadvertently in failing to provide timely notice of its exercise of a 
lease option, and the tenant meets the other requirements for such relief. [Brief of 
Appellant, p. 20-24] Neither Geisdorf, Berets nor any other authorities compel a 
contrary standard or result under Utah law. 
This Court was clear in Geisdorf that it was accepting the majority rule: 
There are instances in which deviation from strict compliance 
may be equitably excused. . . . Some instances in which an 
optionee may be excused from strict compliance include when 
the optionee's conduct in failing to comply was not due to 
willful or gross negligence on the part of the optionee but was 
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rather the result of an honest and justifiable mistake,' Cattle 
Feeders, Inc. v. Jordan, 549 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1977). . ." 972P.2dat71. 
Although Defendants dismiss this clear statement as "obiter dicta" [Brief of 
Appellees, p. 10], it is respectfully submitted that this Court should be regarded as 
having meant what it said in Geisdorf. It is also clear from the reference to Cattle 
Feeders, that this Court accepted the basic premise of that case, and the numerous 
cases from other jurisdictions which have similarly held that negligence which was not 
"willful or gross" could form a basis for granting equitable relief. 
Cattle Feeders itself relied upon Jones v. Gibbs, 130 S.W. 2d 265 (Tex. App. 
1939), as establishing the standard for equitable relief adopted in Texas. The Jones 
court, in turn, expressly adopted the standard established earlier in F. B. Fountain Co. 
v. Stein, 118 A. 47, 50 (Conn. 1922), which clearly allows equitable relief to be 
granted under circumstances constituting inadvertence or mere negligence. [Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 20-25] "The gist of [F. B. Fountain] is that it would be unconscionable 
to enforce literally the condition for the extension when to do so would cause the 
lessee, who had not been grossly negligent, to lose the value of the improvements and 
the goodwill of the established business." Jones, 130 S.W. 2d at 272 [emphasis 
added]. By citing Cattle Feeders, including its reference to "willful or gross 
negligence," the Geisdorf Court surely must have intended to adopt the standard for 
equitable relief followed in that jurisdiction, and must not have intended to limit 
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equitable relief to situations involving honest and justifiable mistake, misrepresentation 
or waiver, as suggested by Defendants. 
Defendants' argument that Berets precludes equitable relief in cases of mere 
neglect is also unavailing for at least two reasons. First, Berets does not provide a 
meaningful discussion or analysis of the standard for granting equitable relief under the 
circumstances at issue in this case, although the opinion does recognize the availability 
of equitable relief: "Courts have no right to disregard any provision of a contract, or to 
save rights that are lost thereunder through the act of the party asking for relief, unless 
it is made to appear that it would be unconscionable or clearly inequitable to do or not 
to do so." 91 P. at 283 [emphasis added]. Although the Court in Berets was not 
compelled by the plaintiffs explanation of inadvertent failure to provide timely notice, 
the Court certainly did not make the broad pronouncement that inadvertence or mere 
negligence bars equitable relief as a matter of law in all cases. 
As support for their broad interpretation of Berets, Defendants cite only one 
Nevada case, Host Intern. Inc. v. Summa Corp., 583 P.2d 1080 (Nev. 1978). The 
Nevada Court's two paragraph per curium opinion concludes that equity does not 
protect a lessee from its own negligent failure to provide the required notice to exercise 
a lease renewal option, citing Berets as authority for this proposition. As discussed 
above, this conclusion overstates the holding in Berets, and is inconsistent with the 
Nevada Court's own prior pronouncements on the subject. In Benetti v. Kishner, 558 
P.2d 537 (Nev. 1977), a case cited in Host, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed a 
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summary judgment in the landlord's favor, recognizing that "special circumstances 
may warrant equitable relief and thus preclude forfeiture of the tenant's right to 
renew." Id. at 538. The Court found that the tenant's excuse for his tardy notice of 
renewal, a belief that such notice was not necessary based on an apparently mistaken 
view of an Addendum to the Lease, created an issue of fact which required a trial. Id. 
at 538-39. This excuse could be construed as mere negligence or inadvertence. If 
equitable relief was unavailable in Nevada as a matter of law due to the tenant's mere 
negligence or inadvertence, remand would have been unnecessary. 
The second reason Berets cannot be read so broadly is that the opinion is now 
almost 100 years' old, and the case law dealing specifically with claims for equitable 
relief under these circumstances is now substantially more developed, as described in 
the Brief of Appellant, Section VI.A(l). It is also curious that Berets was not cited in 
Geisdorf in its discussion of equitable relief, particularly if Defendants' broad reading 
of Berets is correct. If the Court desired to adopt the standard proposed by defendants, 
which would be at odds with the vast majority of jurisdictions, including Texas, the 
Court surely would have expressly so stated, citing Berets as precedent instead of 
Cattle Feeders. 
Finally, Defendants' effort to analogize equitable relief standards relating to 
statutes of limitations and fraud cases to the present facts is unavailing. Courts around 
the country have developed a specific legal standard for equitable relief in option 
renewal cases. This comprehensive line of cases is more compelling in establishing a 
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legal framework for analyzing the present facts than authority dealing with 
distinguishable facts and inapplicable legal theories. 
In light of the above, Defendants' challenges to the legal standard adopted by 
the trial court are without merit, and U. S. Realty is not barred from equitable relief due 
to negligence or inadvertence. 
2. The Evidence. 
The trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's agents, Mark Hoffman and Phil 
Shiffman, were grossly negligent revolves around the fact that neither Hoffman nor 
Shiffman specifically reviewed the Ground Leases after they took over management in 
October 1995, to determine how to exercise the renewal options. Instead, Hoffman 
relied upon Shiffman to alert him to any deadlines based on Lease Abstracts obtained 
from the prior management company. The deficiency of the Lease Abstracts in this 
particular regard was not discovered until Mark Hoffman reviewed the Leases on April 
17, 1998, after the time to provide notice had already passed. Gross negligence 
occurred, in the trial court's view, because Hoffman and Shiffman relied upon Lease 
Abstracts without further confirmation. This Court must determine whether the trial 
court's conclusion that such conduct constitutes gross negligence is correct. 
Gross negligence, in the context of a claim for equitable relief from strict 
compliance with the terms of an option, was perhaps best defined by the Texas Court 
in Inn of the Hills, Ltd. v. Schulgen & Kiser. 723 S.W. 2d 299 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), a 
case discussed in Appellant's Brief. Inn of Hills defined gross neglect as conduct by a 
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party that "reflects] conscious indifference of his right" or "the attitude of a person 
who knew of his peril but demonstrated by his conduct that he did not care." 723 
S.W.2d at 301. Since this Court has indicated, in Geisdorf, an intent to be guided by 
Texas law in regard to this issue and the above definition is consistent with Utah law, 
this definition should be persuasive. 
Here, it is simply impossible to find that U. S. Realty's conduct reflected 
"conscious indifference" of its rights or the attitude of a party who "knew of his peril 
but demonstrated by his conduct that he did not care." U. S. Realty's agents made an 
error due to a mistake in their Lease Abstracts. As soon as they discovered the error, 
they sent the necessary written notice. Obviously, there was neither "conscious 
indifference" to U. S. Realty's rights, nor conduct demonstrating that U. S. Realty 
"knew of its peril" but "did not care." 
U. S. Realty thus contends that the undisputed record evidence supports a 
finding of mistake, inadvertence or, at worst, mere negligence. Hoffman and Shiffman 
testified that they relied on the Abstracts to manage the Leases for two basic reasons. 
First, the Abstracts had been used for a number of years by prior management 
companies to manage the K-Mart Center without any problems. Indeed, the 
undisputed evidence is, and the trial court found that, the omission of the Ground 
Lease option renewal deadlines is the only error or omission that has occurred in the 
Abstracts. Although the Lease Abstracts do not contain any information on the option 
renewal requirements, Shiffman, whose job it was to notify Hoffman of those 
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requirements, was not alerted to this omission because he did not have any prior 
experience administering Ground Leases. [R. 616 p. 172] The single ground lease 
Shiffman had been previously responsible for related to a location in California where 
the ground lease renewed automatically without notice. There is simply no evidence to 
conclude that Shiffman showed an utter lack of care or knew his reliance on the 
Abstracts would cause harm. Rather, at worst the deadline was missed due to 
Shiffman's inexperience with administering Ground Leases. 
The second reason Hoffman and Shiffman relied on the Abstracts was because 
it is a sensible approach to administering leases. Abstracts and tickler systems are used 
to alert the managers of leases to significant deadlines and provide other pertinent 
information in a summary format. It would be impractical to manage each lease on a 
day-to-day basis by constantly referring to the lengthy lease itself. In order to find that 
the standard of care applicable to property managers has been grossly or intentionally 
breached by relying on Lease Abstracts under these circumstances, the trial court 
necessarily would have had to rely on testimony from qualified experts as to the 
appropriate standard of care. Defendants offered no such evidence and, instead, the 
trial court merely substituted its own judgment as to what the standard should require. 
Such an approach and the resultant conclusion of gross neglect are so clearly 
inconsistent with the results in other similar cases that they simply cannot withstand 
appropriate scrutiny by this Court. 
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Finally, Mark Hoffman was not grossly negligent in relying upon Shiffman's 
ability to alert him to the option renewal deadlines based upon the Lease Abstracts. 
Hoffman testified that the letters he received from UDOT regarding the condemnation 
did not cause him concern about the option renewal deadline because Shiffman and the 
Lease Abstracts had always provided a reliable system for alerting him to other 
deadlines. [R. 616 p. 123] The fact that Hoffman's reliance was mistaken in this 
singular instance does not demonstrate conscience indifference or utter lack of care, 
particularly where the failure to provide the notice was of no practical significance to 
Defendants. 
This Court should focus on the totality of the circumstances during the relevant 
time period to evaluate the trial court's conclusion that Hoffman was grossly negligent. 
The trial court found that the parties had engaged in extended negotiations regarding 
the condemnation of certain portions of the K-Mart Center. The condemnation action 
was the precise generator of the letters the trial court found should have alerted 
Hoffman to specifically investigate the option renewal requirements. However, during 
this entire condemnation process, which extended for more than two years, it is 
undisputed that the parties exclusively pursued a resolution that would involve a rent 
reduction for U. S. Realty, but only during the option periods. In fact, the trial court 
found that between April 22, 1998, and July 15, 1998, the parties reached an agreement 
that U. S. Realty would give up any rights to the condemnation proceeds in return for 
Defendants agreeing to reduce the rents during the option periods. [Memorandum 
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Decision, p. 5, par. 13] Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to perceive how 
the requirement of a written notice became of secondary importance to all of the 
parties because they had already reached an agreement that would provide U. S. Realty 
with economic benefit only in the option periods. If the Leases were not going to be 
renewed, this settlement agreement would be of no consequence at all, except 
Defendants would have obtained U. S. Realty's interest in the condemnation proceeds 
without any benefit to U. S. Realty. 
Finally, Defendants' implication that U. S. Realty's notice was intentionally 
delayed pending the arrival of K-Mart's notice to exercise its option is without merit. 
The undisputed evidence clearly contradicts this suggestion. K-Mart did not provide 
its notice to renew until May 18, 1998, almost a month after U. S. Realty provided its 
notices to Defendants. [Ex. P-14] Thus, there is no evidence that U. S. Realty 
intentionally delayed giving notice or that any advantage to U. S. Realty could be 
gained by delaying its notice to wait on K-Mart. 
In summary, the undisputed facts, evaluated under the entirety of circumstances 
within an appropriate legal standard, do not justify a finding of gross negligence. 
C. GEISDORF AND BERETS DO NOT COMPEL THE DENIAL OF EQUITABLE RELIEF 
TO U. S. REALTY UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS, NOR DO THESE CASES 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
Defendants contend that Geisdorf and Berets compel affirmation of the trial 
court's denial of equitable relief to U. S. Realty. This argument is curious since the 
trial court did not cite either case in support of its conclusion that U S. Realty's agents 
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were grossly negligent. In fact, Berets is not cited at all in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision, and both Geisdorf and Berets are clearly distinguishable. 
Neither Geisdorf nor Berets involve a ruling by the trial court that the tenant 
failed to give timely notice due to gross neglect and should, therefore, be denied 
equitable relief, the precise conclusion challenged in this case. Geisdorf is also 
inapplicable because the unsuccessful tenant in that case argued that the doctrine of 
substantial compliance, not equitable relief, was the controlling legal theory. Indeed, 
there is no indication that the tenant in Geisdorf made any mistake at all; the tenant 
simply did not give written notice for reasons he apparently chose not to explain. 
Defendants' assertion that Geisdorf demonstrates a contemporary judicial 
attitude unfavorable to the equitable relief U. S. Realty seeks is also without merit. As 
pointed out by the trial court, the doctrine of equitable relief explains or perhaps even 
justifies the application of the strict construction rule in a manner that provides 
flexibility to preclude inequitable results. [Memorandum Decision, p. 7] The recent 
trend in other jurisdictions is to focus on the economic impact to the tenant from losing 
its leasehold interest due to the delay in providing a required notice. [Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 29-35] Of course, the damage to the landlord, if any, from the delay in 
receiving the notice must be balanced against the tenant's potential economic loss. 
Under this standard, it is difficult to perceive a more compelling case for equitable 
relief than the present case. [Brief of Appellant, pp. 25-26] 
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The undisputed facts of this case are certainly more compelling with respect to 
equitable relief than those in Geisdorf. The unsuccessful tenant in Geisdorf had only a 
three-year lease containing two options to renew for additional five-year periods. The 
lease in question was also not a ground lease pursuant to which the tenant had 
constructed significant improvements at its own expense, but rather involved the lease 
of improved premises owned entirely by the landlord. 972 P.2d at 68-69. In contrast, 
U. S. Realty has 25-year Ground Leases with Defendants, containing six five-year 
renewal options. U. S. Realty and its assignors constructed and maintained large, 
presently-occupied commercial buildings at great cost and expense to U. S. Realty and 
at no cost to Defendants. Further, unlike the tenant in Geisdorf, who can simply move 
his business to a new location, U. S. Realty's business, that being its financial 
relationships with its subtenants, is not so easily transportable, and would be forfeited 
to Defendants in its entirety. 
To deny equitable relief under these circumstances is to deprive U. S. Realty of 
at least $1,300,000 in reasonable economic benefits anticipated during the option 
terms, and to simply hand over to Defendants the keys to U. S. Realty's business 
without any compensation whatsoever. The trial court awarded this significant 
windfall to Defendants based solely on U. S. Realty's delay in providing a notice 
which was admittedly of no practical significance at all. This is precisely the 
unconscionable result the doctrine of equitable relief is intended to preclude, and not a 
single case is cited by either the trial court or defendants that justifies this result. 
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D. U. S. REALTY'S EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIC LOSS IS RELEVANT, WAS 
ADMITTED AND IS NOT SPECULATIVE. 
Defendants purport to raise two challenges to U. S. Realty's evidence of 
economic loss resulting from the termination of its leasehold interests in the K-Mart 
Center. First, Defendants argue that U. S. Realty could somehow reap an unfair 
economic advantage by subsequently selling its interest in the K-Mart Center. [Brief 
of Appellees, pp. 26-27] This argument is nothing more than speculation, is not based 
upon any record evidence and was not raised below. The argument is simply without 
merit and should be disregarded. 
The second argument Defendants raise is that the testimony of William 
Christensen, the certified real estate appraiser called by U. S. Realty, is speculative. 
This argument is also without merit. The testimony of Mr. Christiansen was admitted 
and was not objected to by Defendants' counsel as being speculative. Both Mr. 
Christiansen and Dr. Cris Lewis, an economist, testified that U. S. Realty's economic 
loss, if equitable relief is not granted, is between $1,300,000 and $1,700,000. [Brief of 
Appellant, p. 13] This evidence is undisputed, and the significant extent of U. S. 
Realty's economic loss if equitable relief is denied is beyond legitimate challenge. 
E. U. S. REALTY HAS PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendants apparently miscomprehend the marshaling requirement of Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9). As required by this procedure, U. S. Realty has assembled and 
1
 Defendants' only objection was to relevance, but the Court allowed the testimony and did not 
sustain this objection. 
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provided citations to all of the record evidence supporting the trial court's findings, 
even though Defendants' concede that the trial court's conclusion that U. S. Realty's 
agents were grossly negligent is reviewed for correctness. Defendants have failed to 
cite any evidence that was omitted by U. S. Realty, but rather argue that U. S. Realty's 
position that the marshaled evidence does not support the conclusion of the trial court 
somehow violates the marshaling requirement. It is the conclusions drawn from those 
facts that are at the heart of this appeal, not any specific finding of fact. 
Ill 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts establish that U. S. Realty is entitled to reversal of the trial 
court's Judgment based on theories of implied waiver and equitable relief The trial 
court applied an erroneous legal standard in rejecting implied waiver based upon 
Defendants' claim that they did not have actual knowledge of their contractual right to 
receive a notice of renewal from U. S. Realty, and because Defendants' waiver of this 
right did not cause U. S. Realty to fail to provide timely notice. The undisputed facts 
demonstrate that Defendants impliedly waived their right to receive timely notice due 
primarily to their agreement that U. S. Realty would receive a reduction in rent in the 
option periods in exchange for U. S. Realty's waiver of any right to the condemnation 
proceeds, and by demanding and accepting payment by U. S. Realty for expenses 
relating to the K-Mart Center for the option periods. These facts, coupled with 
Defendants' admitted indifference to the notices actually received, demonstrate, under 
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the totality of circumstances, a distinct intent by Defendants to waive their contractual 
right to receive a timely notice from U. S. Realty. 
The trial court also erred in concluding that U. S. Realty was not entitled to 
equitable relief. The evidence demonstrates that the failure to provide timely notice 
was not due to any willful misconduct or utter lack of care by U. S. Realty's agents, 
but, rather, was the result of an honest and justifiable mistake or, at worst, mere 
negligence. The remaining elements of equitable relief are clearly present and cannot 
be legitimately disputed. U. S. Realty's delay in providing notice was slight, and the 
delay in providing notice to a lessor was of no consequence. Finally, to refuse 
equitable relief would result in the unconscionable loss of U. S. Realty's significant 
leasehold interest, giving an entirely unearned windfall to Defendants. 
As a result of the foregoing, U. S. Realty respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's Judgment and enter an Order granting U. S. Realty the 
equitable relief it seeks in the form of a declaratory judgment excusing its failure to 
provide timely notice and declaring that Defendants have impliedly waived any right to 
receive such notice. 
DATED this day of November, 2000. 
YOUNG, ADAMS & HOFFMAN, LLP 
JeremyM .H(piffmm 
b6tyvciky/ox Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day of 
wtffJwtA 2000, true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following counsel of record, to-wit: 
George K. Fadel, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
-23-
